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Abstract
Recursive least squares learning is a central concept employed in selecting amongst
competing outcomes of dynamic stochastic economic models. In employing least squares
estimators, such learning relies on the assumption of a symmetric loss function defined
over estimation errors. Within a statistical decision making context, this loss function
can be understood as a second order approximation to a von-Neumann Morgenstern
utility function. This paper considers instead the implications for adaptive learning
of a third order approximation. The resulting asymmetry leads the estimator to put
more weight on avoiding mistakes in one direction as opposed to the other. As a pre-
caution against making a more costly mistake, a statistician biases his estimates in
the less costly direction by an amount proportional to the variance of the estimate.
We investigate how this precautionary bias will aﬀect learning dynamics in a model of
inflationary biases. In particular we find that it is possible to maintain a lower long
run inflation rate than could be obtained in a time consistent rational expectations
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models can produce multiple outcomes depending
on the equilibrium concept employed. For example, following Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983), models in which a central bank sets monetary policy over time
when facing a public with rational expectations can deliver one of two outcomes. The Nash
equilibrium concept delivers a time-consistent high inflation outcome, while the Ramsey
equilibrium concept delivers a time-inconsistent low inflation outcome. Assuming that the
central bank learns the latent parameters of the structural Phillips curve by estimating
least squares regressions over the entire time series of data on a ‘perceived’ (and possibly
misspecified) Phillips curve in order to set monetary policy, it is possible to state a stability
condition whereby the Nash outcome is selected as the one that is ‘learnable’, and therefore
expected to arise in reality.1 On the other hand, if more weight is given to more recent data,
Sargent (1999) and Cho et al (2002) have shown that an economy may occasionally ‘escape’
for brief periods to the Ramsey outcome.
In this paper we ask whether information processing, modeled via statistical decision
making, can enhance the learning dynamics obtained in the constant gain case. In particular,
we model the information processing decision separately from the optimal policy-making
decision. This dichotomy allows us to incorporate alternate assumptions on information
processing. Consequently, any contributions to the dynamics of learning that alternative
assumptions provide can be explicitly identified. In order to motivate this approach it is
instructive to view the adaptive learning process through a statistical decision making lens,
as follows.
Adaptive learning begins from the assumption of least squares estimation. Least squares
estimation assumes, following Zellner (1971) and Berger (1985), that a statistical decision
maker minimizes a squared error loss function, faces an underlying data generating process
that is Gaussian in nature and employs Bayes’ rule to update parameter estimates as new
1See Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001).
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data arrives. Econometricians typically assume that the loss function is a primitive of this
statistical decision problem. However, as Berger (1985) demonstrates, the squared error loss
function can be derived from a second-order Taylor series approximation to a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function defined over ‘rewards’ to a statistical decision maker (SDM).
Within the context of a central bank that learns about the economy, a reward could be
in the form of a reputation for interpreting varied socioeconomic data ‘correctly’. Several
recent articles have examined the eﬀects of allowing a central bank to have an asymmetric
loss function for policy-making (e.g. Ruge-Murcia (2003)). However, following Cukierman
(2002) who suggests examining sources of the degree of transparency of a central banks
models and objectives, we examine here the eﬀects of asymmetry in how a central bank
might learn about underlying hazy fundamentals, while keeping the policy-making objective
function symmetric.
Suppose that the SDM views overestimation of the unknown parameters as more costly
than underestimation. A third-order approximation to the underlying utility function is
necessary for this assumption to aﬀect the SDM’s actions. This paper first demonstrates
that such a SDM would have an asymmetric loss function, derived by taking a third-order
approximation to the underlying utility function. The asymmetry will then cause the SDM to
behave in a ‘precautionary’ manner. Indeed, the mathematics underlying this interpretation
of the asymmetry is essentially the same as in Leland’s (1968) study of precautionary saving.
Given an asymmetric loss function, this paper specifies the recursive form of the optimal
estimator chosen by a precautionary SDM. Finally, within the context of the Kydland and
Prescott (1977)-Barro and Gordon (1983) model, this paper discusses the dynamics of such
‘precautionary learning’ in terms of the stability of the Nash and Ramsey outcomes. Cho et
al (2002) have shown escape dynamics induced by the assumption of a constant gain in least
squares learning suggest that an economy may occasionally and briefly deviate to an outcome
that has not been defined to be stable. The simulation results in this paper suggest that
an economy may possess more complicated dynamics that enhance the likelihood of such
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escape. In particular, we find that the frequency of escape can be higher, or the economy
can fluctuate around a lower level of inflation than the Nash outcome, depending upon the
parameterized degree of asymmetry. For some parameter values, the economy can even settle
around the Ramsey outcome.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses existing statistical decision
theory, shows that a precautionary SDM employs an asymmetric loss function and provides
the recursive form of the resulting alternative estimator. In Section 3 a form of the Kydland
and Prescott (1977)-Barro and Gordon (1983) environment is specified. Section 4 provides
simulation results within this context and discusses which outcome may be selected under
the assumption of precautionary learning. Section 5 concludes with our finding and its’
underlying intuition.
2 Precautionary Motives in Statistical Decisions
2.1 The Standard Case
Following Berger (1985), a SDM faces the following problem when deciding upon the
loss function upon which to base estimation. Given a set of states of nature or parameterseθ ∈ Θ, the decision maker takes an action ea ∈ eA in order to maximize utility (g) which is
a function of the estimation error (eθ − ea). Assuming that g is strictly concave and thrice
continuously diﬀerentiable yields the following Taylor series approximation of g(eθ−ea) around
0:
g(eθ − ea) ' g(0) + (eθ − ea)g1(0) + (eθ − ea)2g11(0)
2
(1)
where g1 denotes the first derivative and so on. Next, define the following expectations:
K0 ≡ −E[g(0)], K1 ≡ −E[g1(0)], K2 ≡ −E
∙
g11(0)
2
¸
> 0. (2)
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Given this environment, Berger (1985) defines the loss function for estimation as,
L(eθ,ea) ' −E[g(eθ − ea)], (3)
which, given re-definition of the action space as eA∗ = {ea− c, c = K1
2K2
|ea ∈ eA} results in
L(eθ,ea) = (eθ − ea)2. (4)
Given this symmetric loss function, optimality of the least squares estimator is assured.
2.2 The Precautionary Case
If the SDM has a precautionary motive then a third-order approximation of the utility
function is required to account for this motive. We assume that the SDM seeks to maximize
utility E[g(λ(ea− eθ)] where λ is a scale parameter that measures how sensitive the decision
maker is to deviations of ea from eθ. Define the loss function to be
L(eθ,ea) = −E[g(λ(ea− eθ))]. (5)
Under the assumption that g is diﬀerentiable to the fourth degree with respect to ea − eθ, a
Taylor series approximation is
L(eθ,ea) ≈ −E[g(0)]− λ(ea− eθ)E[g1(0)]
−1
2
λ2(ea− eθ)2E[g11(0)]− 1
6
λ3(ea− eθ)3E[g111(0)]. (6)
We wish the optimal objective for the statistical decision-maker to be to choose ea = eθ, which
implies the conditions E[g1(0)] = 0 and E[g11(0)] < 0 so that ea = eθ is the local minimum of
the loss function. It can further be assumed that E[g(0)] = 0 since a constant can be added
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to the utility function without changing the underlying structure. Next, define
K2 = −E[g11(0)] (7)
K3 = −E[g111(0)], (8)
then the loss function simplifies to
L(eθ,ea) ≈ 1
2
K2λ2(ea− eθ)2 + 1
6
K3λ3(ea− eθ)3. (9)
Further, assuming as in the standard case, that the statistical decision-maker chooses ea to
minimize E?θ[L(eθ,ea)] (given beliefs about the distribution of eθ), the first order condition
reduces to
K2(ea− μ?θ) + λK32 [(ea− μ?θ)2 + σ2?θ] = 0 (10)
where
μ?θ = E?θ[eθ] (11)
σ2?θ = E?θ[(
eθ − μ?θ)2]. (12)
Assuming that the optimal ea follows
ea = ea0 + λea1 + λ2ea2 + ..., (13)
then to the zero-th order in λ
ea0 = μ?θ (14)
and to first order in λ
K2(ea0 + λea1 − μ?θ) + λK32 [(λea1)2 + σ2?θ] = 0. (15)
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Dropping the second and higher order terms in λ one can compute
ea ≈ μ?θ − λ2K3K2σ2?θ. (16)
In particular, with respect to estimation problems, we assume that the loss function takes
the following LINEX form,
L(ea,eθ) = exp(b(eθ − ea))− b(eθ − ea)− 1 ≈ b2
2
(eθ − ea)2 + b3
6
(eθ − ea)3 (17)
Thus,
K2λ2 = b2 (18)
K3λ3 = −b3 (19)
and,
ea = μ?θ + b2σ2?θ. (20)
This discussion is applied to the adaptive least squares learning process described below.
3 The Economic Environment
Cho et al (2002) describe a model in which the monetary authority uses least squares
learning to determine its policy. The monetary authority’s beliefs are described by a vector
of regression coeﬃcients eγ. It chooses a decision rule h(eγ) that causes the stochastic process
for the economy to be eξ(eγ). Given eξ(eγ) the best fitting regression will be Γ = T (eγ). A
self-confirming equilibrium is a fixed point of T .
Here we consider what happens if we separate the monetary authority into two entities:
a statistician and a policy maker. The statistician’s beliefs are described by a vector of
regression coeﬃcients eγ. Based on those regression coeﬃcients, the statistician estimates
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bφ(eγ) where φ is the object of interest to the policy maker, which in turn summarizes the
beliefs of the policy maker about the economy. The policy maker then follows a decision
rule H(φ) that causes the stochastic process for the economy to be eξ(H). Finally, given eξ,
the best fitting regression by the statistician in the next period will be Γ(eξ). If we define
T (eγ) = Γ(eξ(H(bφ(eγ))) then a self confirming equilibrium is a fixed point of T .
Suppose that the statisticians goal is to minimize a loss function L(bφ − φ) and a is a
scalar that measures the degree of precaution in reporting estimates to the policy maker,
where a = 0 implies no such precautionary motive. Then the estimated function of interest
is bφ(γ|a) and will be a function of a. In the event that a = 0 the statistician and policy
maker coincide and there is no dichotomy.
3.1 The Basic Model
As an example of how the dichotomy between a policy maker and a loss averse statisti-
cian might interact, we consider the following model of inflation and unemployment adapted
from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Cho et al (2002). Let Ut represent unemployment
and πt represent inflation. The monetary authority chooses its target inflation rate xt to
minimize the loss function
Lp(xt) = E[πt(xt)2 + αUt(xt)2], (21)
where Ut is governed by
Ut = u− θ(πt − bxt) + σ1W1t (22)
and
πt = xt + σ2W2t. (23)
where (σ1, σ2) > 0, and (W1t,W2t)T are i.i.d. normally distributed shocks with zero means
and identity covariance matrices. In the Phillips curve above, bxt is the private sector’s
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expectation of inflation at t, u > 0 is the natural rate of unemployment and θ > 0 is the
slope.
Let us suppose that the monetary authority takes bxt as given. Then, given the above
loss minimization problem,
xt =
αθ
1 + αθ2
(u+ θbxt) . (24)
is the optimal inflation target. Under rational expectations, xt = bxt, so the optimal policy
is x∗t = αθu. This corresponds to the time-consistent Nash equilibrium of Kydland and
Prescott (1977). Thus, in equilibrium, E[Ut] = u and E[πt] = αθu and
Lp(x∗t ) = α
2θ2u2 + σ22 + αu
2 + α
£
θ2σ22 + σ
2
1
¤
= (1 + αθ2)(αu2 + σ22) + ασ
2
1. (25)
On the other hand, if the monetary authority did not try to exploit the private sector’s
expectations and just assumed the private sector would know what it was doing, then the
enlightened policy maker’s loss function is
Lep(xt) = x
2
t + σ
2
2 + αu
2 + α
£
θ2σ22 + σ
2
1
¤
, (26)
where bxt is set equal to xt. Then clearly, the optimal policy is xt = 0, so E[Ut] = u and
E[πt] = 0. Then
Lep(0) = σ
2
2 + αu
2 + α
£
θ2σ22 + σ
2
1
¤
= αu2 + (1 + αθ2)σ22 + ασ
2
1 < Lp(x
∗
t ). (27)
This corresponds to the time-inconsistent Ramsey policy of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
This is the optimal policy, but it is not supportable over time because the monetary authority
has an incentive to inflate to get a lower unemployment rate, so there is an inflationary bias.
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3.2 Least Squares Learning
Adaptive least squares learning begins by first assuming that the monetary authority
has a perceived law of motion (PLM)
Ut = u0 − ωπt + ηt, (28)
while the actual law of motion (ALM) is given by
Ut = u− θ(πt − xt) + σ1W1t, (29)
where we have assumed rational expectations on the part of the public and, as before,
πt = xt + σ2W2t. (30)
Suppose now that the policy maker determines policy by minimizing the loss function
Lp(xt) = Ep[πt(xt)2 + αUt(xt)2], (31)
where the expectation is determined by the PLM. Then
Lp(xt) = Ep
£
(xt + σ2W2t)
2 + α (u0 − ω(xt + σ2W2t) + ηt)2
¤
= x2t + α(u0 − ωxt)2 +Ep[σ22W 22t + α(ηt − ωσ2W2t)2], (32)
which has the first-order condition
2xt − 2ωα(u0 − ωxt) = 0. (33)
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Thus, the monetary authority will follow the policy
xLSt =
αωu0
1 + αω2
. (34)
Plugging the monetary authority’s policy into the ALM, we get the system of equations
Ut = u− θ
µ
πt −
αωu0
1 + αω2
¶
+ σ1W1t (35)
πt =
αωu0
1 + αω2
+ σ2W2t (36)
In a self-confirming equilibrium, the policy will be chosen so the ALM (35) and the PLM
(28) are the same. Thus,
u0 = u+
αθωu0
1 + αω2
(37)
ω = θ. (38)
This system has the solution
u0 = u+
αθ2
1 + αθ2
u0 (39)
u =
u0
1 + αθ2
(40)
u0 = (1 + αθ2)u. (41)
Note that in the self-confirming equilibrium,
xLS = αθu, (42)
which is the same high-inflation but time-consistent policy pursued by the fully rational
monetary authority.
The idea is that if the ALM can be learned via least squares, the monetary authority
will converge to a high-inflation policy. The question of this paper is whether introducing
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precautionary motives into the learning process can aﬀect the dynamics of reaching the
high-inflation policy.
3.3 Precautionary Learning
Suppose the policy maker is assumed to myopically set policy so as to minimize the
loss function specified above and the private sector has rational expectations so bxt = xt. As
before, the monetary authority models the economy with a linear Phillips curve such that
Ut is a linear projection on πt and the information available at t.
Let us assume that the statistician estimates the PLM
Ut = u0 − ωπt + ηt, (43)
where ω is a scalar, u0 is a constant, and ηt is a mean-zero, serially uncorrelated noise term.
Let us suppose the statistician is particularly interested in knowing ω and also suppose that
the statistician is more concerned about overestimating ω rather than underestimating it.
As a result, the statistician chooses its estimate bω so as to minimize the LINEX loss function
Lts(bωt) = Et £ea(ω−?ωt) − a(ω − bωt)− 1¤ . (44)
If the statistician believes at t that ω ∼ N(μtω, (σtω)2), then
Lts(bωt) = expµa(μtω − bω) + a2(σtω)22
¶
− a(μtω − bωt)− 1, (45)
so
dLs
dbωt = −a exp
µ
a(μtω − bωt) + a2(σtω)22
¶
+ a = 0, (46)
and the optimal estimate will satisfy
a(μtω − bωt) + a2(σtω)22 = 0 (47)
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or
bωt = μtω + a2(σtω)2. (48)
Thus, if a > 0, it is more costly for the statistician to underestimate ω than to over-
estimate ω, so he makes a higher, more conservative estimate than he would if he had a
quadratic loss function (corresponding to a = 0). The opposite is true if a < 0.
The statistician will use the Kalman filter to update his estimate of ω in the perceived
Phillips curve to bωt. Then the policy maker will choose xt so as to minimize
Lp(xt) = Ep[(xt + σ2W2t)
2 + α (−bωt (xt + σ2W2t) + u0 + ηt)2]. (49)
This simplifies to
Lp(xt) = x2t + α
£
(−bωtxt + u0)2 +Ep £σ2W 22t + (−bωtσ2W2t + ηt)2¤¤ (50)
since the policy maker believes that bothW2t and ηt are mean zero. The variance-covariance
matrix of W2t and ηt does not aﬀect the policy makers decision since the last term is inde-
pendent of xt. The policy maker will choose xt to satisfy the first-order condition
2xt − 2αbωt (−bωtxt + u0) = 0. (51)
Thus, the optimal choice will be
x∗t =
αbωt
1 + αbω2t u0. (52)
Given the statistician’s underlying precautionary motives and his beliefs, this is
x∗t =
α
£
μtω +
a
2
(σtω)2
¤
1 + α
£
μtω +
a
2
(σtω)2
¤2u0. (53)
Using Evans and Honkapohja (2001)’s Ricatti equations, which do not involve the esti-
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mate of the error variance (but also require the inversion of a matrix), we have
bξLSt+1|t = bξLSt|t−1 + t−1R−1t xt ³yt − xTt bξLSt|t−1´ (54)
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1
¡
xtxTt −Rt−1
¢
, (55)
where in the present context yt = ut, xt = (1, πt)T , ξ represents the recursive parameter
estimate (e.g. the slope of the Phillips curve). For constant gain learning, we replace t−1
by γ−1, where γ is a constant. Eﬀectively, the learner will behave as though he is considers
only a moving window of the last γ observations.
The estimate of the variance-covariance matrix will then be
PLSt+1|t = t
−1R−1t bσ2t+1|t, (56)
where
bσ2t+1|t = bσ2t|t−1
+
1
t− r
½³
yt − xTt bξt|t−1´2 £1− t−1xTt R−1t xt¤
+ 2
t− 1
t
(bξTt|t−1Rt−1 − St−1)R−1t xt(yt − xTt bξt|t−1)− bσ2t|t−1¾ . (57)
and
St =
1
t
tX
i=1
yixTi (58)
is a 1× r row vector that satisfies the Ricatti equation
St = St−1 + t−1(ytxTt − St−1).
Generalizing, we then get the precautionary learning equation
(bξt+1|t)i = ³bξLSt+1|t´
i
+
ai
2
(PLSt+1|t)ii, (59)
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where i = 1, . . . , r and ξ consists as before of the regression parameters estimated by the
SDM and provided to the policy-maker. We now provide simulation results of the model to
evaluate whether the low inflation outcome is reachable.2 In the simulation results we let
γ−1 be the constant Kalman gain of the Ricatti equations as in Cho et al (2002) and vary
that as well.
4 Simulation Results
Our first objective in simulating the model economy is to verify whether or not we obtain
escape dynamics given a lack of precaution (in order to replicate the results, for instance, in
Cho et al (2002)). Next, allowing for a degree of precaution (a) on the estimated slope of
the Phillips curve (θ), we investigate whether the Ramsey outcome is attainable under the
following three scenarios. First, holding the degree of precaution and the Kalman gain (γ)
constant, we vary the value of the shocks hitting the simulated model economy (σ1 and σ2).
Second, we vary the Kalman gain as in Cho et al (2002) and finally we vary the degree of
precaution on the slope of the Phillips curve. The simulations are conducted under certain
fixed parameters as indicated in Table 1 and were conducted for 10000 periods. Given the
fixed parameter values, Nash inflation is 10% and Ramsey inflation is 0%. Next, Table 2
provides the values for the parameters that are varied and indicates the time series for the
targeted rate of inflation (xt) that arise given the varied model parameters. These time series
are then plotted in Figures 1-4.
2We are not aware of any stochastic approximation techniques that would allow us to derive diﬀerential
equations that would approximate the stochastic diﬀerence equations that result from the recursive form of
the asymmetric least squares estimator suggested here.
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Table 1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value
α 1
u 5
θ 2
Table 2: Varied Parameters
Parameter Value
Figure 1 Figure 2
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
γ−1 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100
a 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
σ1 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
σ2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
Figure 3 Figure 4
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
γ−1 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100
a 6 6 6 6 9 9 9 9
σ1 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
σ2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
Figure 1 below provides the plots for targeted inflation when there is no precaution in
learning. The plot demonstrates that as expected the time consistent high inflation Nash
outcome is achieved. However, also as expected, escapes from Nash to Ramsey levels do
occur for particular parameter configurations.
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Figure 1: No Precaution
Figure 2 below provides plots for targeted inflation under a ‘low’ level of precaution
(a = 3). The plots here indicate a much higher frequency of escape. Indeed for a higher gain
(γ−1 = 20) the plots indicate quite frequent departures from the Nash outcome. When the
gain is much smaller (γ−1 = 100) there actually seems to be overshooting behavior whence
targeted inflation actually rises above the Nash outcome only to fall to the Ramsey outcome
and then begin a relatively slow rise to the Nash level. That is, we see some dynamics in
between the two outcomes.
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Figure 2: Low Precaution
Next, Figure 3 below provides plots for targeted inflation under a ‘medium’ level of
precaution (a = 6). The plots here indicate stability at the Ramsey outcome regardless
of the value for the variance of the presumed shocks to the unemployment or inflation
equations provided that γ−1 = 20. For γ−1 = 100 there seems to be some overshooting
above the Nash outcome level with a fall to the Ramsey outcome and a relatively slow rise
to the Nash outcome. Once again, we see some dynamics at least in simulation given that
the SDM employs an asymmetric least squares estimator reflecting a degree of precaution in
the interpretation of data.
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Figure 3: Medium Precaution
Finally, Figure 4 below provides plots for targeted inflation under a ‘high’ level of pre-
caution (a = 9).
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Figure 4: High Precaution
The plots indicate that for γ−1 = 20, regardless of the variance of the shocks hitting the
unemployment and inflation equations, the targeted level of inflation is actually hovering
around a negative value. Furthermore, for γ−1 = 100 we again seem some dynamics with
only occasional overshooting.
Given these simulations for varying degrees of precaution, one might wish to ascertain
what is the optimal level of precaution for the statistician to exhibit. Table 3 provides the
average value of the loss function for each of the 16 simulations.
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Table 3: Simulated Loss
Parameter Value
Figure 1 Figure 2
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
γ−1 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100
a 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
σ1 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
σ2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
Loss 117.40 134.12 124.32 133.17 49.54 73.25 161.32 235.55
Figure 3 Figure 4
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
γ−1 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100
a 6 6 6 6 9 9 9 9
σ1 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
σ2 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
Loss 31.93 40.25 220.63 359.19 32.72 39.77 65.01 137.89
What is clear from Table 3 is that introduction of the precautionary parameter leads
to lower values of the loss function being optimized by the policy-maker, relative to the no
precaution case, when γ−1 = 20. For γ−1 = 100 this is not necessarily the case. Next, the
lowest level of the loss occurs for the targeted inflation series X9 which corresponds to the
a = 6 ‘medium’ level of the precautionary parameter. As per the first panel in Figure 3 this
is the case in which inflation fluctuates closely around the Ramsey outcome. In summary, it
is entirely feasible that for certain values of the precautionary parameter the loss experienced
by the monetary authority may be lower and the authority might still consistently target
inflation around the Ramsey outcome.
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5 Conclusion
The adaptive learning approach is a rich environment in which stability, perturbation,
and other issues can be analyzed with respect to models with multiple possible outcomes.
In this paper the approach has been to analyze learning dynamics in the event that a policy
maker is split into the usual economic decision maker and into a statistical decision maker
who exhibits a degree of precaution in forming estimates of the Phillips curve. In simulation
we can show that we do obtain learning dynamics that are rich enough to warrant further
analytical investigation. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any method by which stochastic
approximation can be conducted for the constant gain case under precaution, so we limit
our analysis to presenting the simulation results. These results suggest a possible tension
between the pull of time-consistency and the degree to which a statistical decision maker is
cautious about interpreting information (reflected in the estimator employed). We show that
in simulation it is possible that the targeted rate of inflation tends to the Ramsey outcome
and may stay there for some time.
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